How to make a Ponzi on friend.tech?

Author: Sukie.eth

The fundamental way to trap users is to improve the efficiency of establishing interest relationships.

The long-term existence of a social product is to give users a reason to be trapped in your system.

Before the specific operation, let us first review how the (3,3) and ve (3,3) flywheels used by the large Ponzi fly:

The first is (3,3). OHM uses a very classic case in game theory, the prisoner’s dilemma, which is a type of non-zero-sum game in game theory. Simply put, when users both choose (stake, stake) or (bond, bond) Then the bubble will get bigger and bigger.

Then there is ve (3,3), which is a combination of Curve’s ve (vote escrow) model and the OlympusDao (3,3) model. ve refers to the transaction in which users can obtain Curve after staking CRV tokens. Fee sharing, Boost’s LP income, voting for projects, obtaining airdrops of tokens from other cooperative projects, etc., ve(3,3) adjusts the amount of token issuance by locking the amount of tokens to promote Everyone locks up their positions together to prevent the token value from being diluted (the founder AC has run away).

Then we return to FT’s economic model. FT’s stock pricing formula is price per share (ETH) = (supply^ 2)/16000

To briefly explain this formula, the square of the total number of shares refers to the market value of the KOL. For example, if you have 10 holders, then your market value is 100. After dividing by 16,000, the price of one of your Keys is 0.00625 ETH.

We can see that this is a classic prisoner's dilemma problem.

The number of people supplying increases exponentially. When the 10th person buys, the first person to buy makes 100 times. When the 100th person buys, the 10th person to buy makes 100 times.

There is always a price difference between buying and selling, and the price difference is (2n + 1) / 16000. This formula indicates that as n increases, the spread will increase linearly. For every additional unit of n, the spread will increase by 2/16000, which is 0.000125.

So selling is a typical weak equilibrium behavior (-3,-3).

So let’s take these two models as an opportunity to talk about how an FT blogger can turn himself into a Ponzi model?

In fact, the core of Ponzi is just a few things:

1. Use game theory to persuade holders not to sell coins, motivate users but encourage users not to cash out rewards. Find ways to lock up positions or allow users to delay sales to lock users into the system and reduce selling pressure.

2. Crazy build momentum to increase influence, achieve early network start-up effect through the CX model of person-to-person transmission, and continuously attract new members and external funds.

3. Create income cash flow, provide incentives to users, and achieve positive externalities.

I have always said that we should not underestimate Ponzi. The most ideal form of Ponzi is actually a win-win situation, which is a Nash equilibrium. The premise is that the speed of obtaining positive externalities can catch up with the slowdown of new innovations.

Then this FT group is designed like this:

1. Establish rules, incentives and hierarchies:

a. Users must purchase the KOL’s Key to join the group. After joining the group, they will leave their Twitter account and self-introduction, as well as the value they can bring to the community and promise that they will never sell it and become a family to everyone. The KOL will reply to the user. , let his message be seen by everyone, and other family members in the group should follow his Twitter/purchase his Key.

b. Design an incentive mechanism so that users can obtain more benefits without leaving the group, such as 1) getting the attention of users in the group, self-promotion, and gaining the social value of the community 2) obtaining high-quality alpha in the group Information 3) Upgrade within the group and discuss cooperation with the community to obtain benefits such as whitelisting and airdrops/advertising.

c. Develop hierarchy and build community identity.

Regularly elect community managers, and set 10% of the members in the community as administrators, responsible for activating the community atmosphere, planning activities for the community, attracting new members, etc.

The group owner distributes part of the handling fee to motivate a small number of people in the group, triggering competition.

Make everyone have a sense of presence in the community, such as electing high-quality content output by group members every day, publishing it to the outside world, attracting new members, carrying the sedan chair to everyone, and sharing profits.

d. Inviting people to the group will unlock new privileges.

2. Establish a penalty mechanism other than 0.000125:

a. The seller will be publicly posted. Let’s unblock the seller’s user together and write words such as “shame on you” on Twitter.

b. Every time a person withdraws, the group leader uses the handling fee to repurchase, and calls on the group members to buy together (3,3) to raise the price, so that sellers have to pay more if they want to join the group.

3. Create a ve model of the community to seek external benefits and distribute dividends to the community

a. Once the community becomes bigger, it can take on projects and AMA

b. Determine the future profit direction of the community through voting

c. Ethical lock-up, each user promises not to sell at xx time point

d. Use handling fees for repurchase

From a mechanical point of view, I really want to make a fuss about the 16,000, that is, if the group members choose to lock up, the more people lock up, the number of the dividend 16,000 will become smaller. (Just a small inspiration, not sure what to expect)

According to this model, we will get a Friend tech version of the income matrix:

In this matrix, if all users choose not to sell, the community will grow and each user will receive exponential benefits, that is (+3, +3). If you sell the Key, you will receive a price difference of 0.000125. punish.

In fact, I have seen many people criticize FT for not having a social graph or content, just for Ponzi. Thread launched by Facebook before, and the short-lived Nostr Damus, all illustrate the truth that short-term traffic input cannot make a social product survive.

What is the fundamental reason why a social product can exist for a long time?

It is to give users a reason to be trapped in your system.

The fundamental way to trap users is to improve the efficiency of establishing interest relationships.

For example, Taobao, a social software, connects merchants and users.

So what are users looking for in Friend tech? I think in addition to the so-called airdrop expectations, there is also the opportunity to talk to top users. This is like the essence of some high-end communities, MBA classes, and paid communities. That is to say, there are people you want to know here. You only need to pay to talk to the top KOLs. Moreover, if you come late, the price will increase. .

If it were you, would you be fo or not? After all, traveling to Singapore to participate in Token2049 will cost several thousand dollars in travel expenses. This few cents is definitely not a loss.

How to achieve early launch of social products? Who says using Ponzi isn't a good idea?

Of course, I also think Friend tech had obvious flaws when designing this economic model:

1. Selling out is very casual. When the price rises, buying orders decrease and subsequent selling pressure cannot be stopped.

2. Others cannot see other people’s comments unless the group owner replies. This will reduce the presence of community users, reduce stickiness, and make it difficult to classify users in the group. It is equivalent to a super node for the group owner. Faced with A large number of users, more than 100 people, the group owner is unable to manage, there is no user classification, users manage users, the group will die. Because top users divert traffic, waist user social networking has been proven to be an effective social software operating system, while Friend tech seems to be one-to-many. Many ordinary users are silent and it is difficult to gain attention and achieve sustained growth.

3. The function is single, unable to accumulate valuable content, and it is even more difficult to expand social functions such as red envelopes/voting/greetings.

4. Because it has functional and product flaws compared to traditional social media, it is difficult to expand external users except for degen users in the currency circle. Subsequent growth is weak and the story cannot be told.

So currently it is only supported by the expectation of issuing coins. I don’t think there are any other ways to continue to stimulate this project after the coins are issued. Unless he becomes Curve.

Problems that need to be solved urgently at this stage:

1. Add locking functions, such as locking Key, so you can speak freely in the group without the group owner replying.

2. Grant corresponding privileges based on the lock-up time to unlock more functions.

3. Develop a multi-chain ecosystem, no longer pay with ETH, but switch to other currencies or even develop the traditional knowledge planet model, place advertisements, and absorb external funds. Of course, from the perspective of the interests of the Base chain and ETH, this matter is not a high priority.